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Former British official defends choices on Iraq

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The man who served as press secretary, confidant and attack dog for former British Prime Minister Tony Blair today doggedly defended Britain’s decision to join Washington in invading Iraq. The World’s Laura Lynch reports from London on Alastair Campbell’s testimony to the Iraq panel.

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JEB SHARP:  I’m Jeb Sharp and this is The World, a co-production of the BBC World Service, PRI and WGBH in Boston.  Nearly eight years after the invasion of Iraq, some countries continue to question their own participation in the war.  Today, a commission in the Netherlands concluded the war lacked a solid mandate under international war.  Also today, former Prime Minster, Tony Blair’s closest aide, took the stand in Britain’s Iraq war inquiry.  Alastair Campbell spent close to five hours doggedly defending Blair’s decision to join the U.S. in the invasion.  But Campbell also offered some glimpses into a sometimes testy relationship with the White House. The World’s Laura Lynch reports from London.

LAURA LYNCH:  From the start, Alastair Campbell was combative and defiant, insisting he would never have done anything illegal for his former boss.

ALASTAIR CAMPBELL:  Look, if he asked me to jump off a building, I wouldn’t have done it.  If he asked me to …

SPEAKER:  Are you serious?

CAMPBELL:  No, if he asked me to do anything that I thought to be silly or improper, I wouldn’t do it.

LYNCH:  Campbell was Blair’s closest advisor, at his side throughout the run-up to the invasion of Iraq.  To a degree, today’s appearance was familiar territory for Campbell.  He’s already defended himself and Blair’s actions before three other inquiries.  This time around, Campbell rejected any suggestion that Blair came to accept the idea of regime change in Iraq as early as April of 2002.  That’s when Blair met George W. Bush at his Texas ranch.

CAMPBELL: They clearly shared the analysis that Saddam was an awful, brutal dictatorial, barbarous regime.  They shared the fear about his WMD program and George Bush would simply say, as he said publicly at the press conference, our policy is regime change.  Tony Blair was making clear that the British policy was to pursue disarmament, to force him to face up to his obligations, his excessive United Nations resolutions.

LYNCH:  Today Campbell characterized relations with the Bush Administration as occasionally rocky.  He said senior officials, including Vice President, Dick Cheney, often made statements that made it difficult for Blair to build the case for war.

CAMPBELL:  And sometimes did you think that the Americans were being you know, impossibly difficult to deal with on this or that?   Of course you did.  But that would at least explain the British, you know, the British government, in my view, has to stand up for its own policies and its own ways.

LYNCH:  But Campbell faced the sharpest questioning over a crucial report Blair delivered to Parliament in the months before the war.

SPEAKER:  is weapons of mass destruction program is active, detailed and growing.  The policy of containment is not working.  The weapons of mass destruction program is not shut down, it is up and running now.

LYNCH:  The report summarized what Blair called incontrovertible evidence of Saddam Hussein’s ability to quickly deploy his arsenal.  Newspaper headlines screamed warnings about Saddam’s ability to fire his weapons within 45 minutes.  While Campbell conceded the now famous dossier could have been a bit clearer, he called it a solid piece of work.

CAMPBELL:  I defend every single word of the dossier.  I defend every single part of the process.  And I think it was a genuine attempt by the prime minister and the government to engage the public properly in understanding why the prime minister was thinking it was developing as it was.

LYNCH:  Campbell said he never asked the head of intelligence to tailor his reports to strengthen the case for war.  But inquiry commissioner, Sir Roderic Lyne reminded Campbell that in the months leading up to Blair’s report, officials called the intelligence on Iraq patchy.

RODERIC LYNE:  I think crucially, the assessment of the ninth of September, 2002, the intelligence remains limited.

LYNCH:  Two weeks later, Blair was on his feet in the House of Commons, saying the evidence was beyond doubt.

CAMPBELL:  I can only tell you, from the position I was in, not as an intelligence person, as the Prime Minister’s communications director, alongside the prime minster, as he is engaged in ongoing dialogue with intelligence agencies about the intelligence that they presented to him and that is his, the way that he decided to put it to the public at that time.

LYNCH:  Campbell’s answer leaves plenty of room for Tony Blair, himself to explain why he was so convinced Saddam has a huge weapon stockpile.  Today, the former aide remained loyal to his boss, saying he still believes Blair did the right thing in taking Britain into a U.S. led war that is still deeply unpopular here.  For The World, I’m Laura Lynch in London.

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