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Al Qaeda defectors

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Anchor Marco Werman speaks with former 9/11 Commission counsel Michael Jacobson about his study on people who defect from Al Qaeda. Jacobson is now with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

• “Terrorist Dropouts: Learning from Those Who Have Left”
• Jacobson’s article on FP.com

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MARCO WERMAN: Academic institutions are under particular scrutiny now given yesterday’s intelligence warning about Al-Qaeda’s  intentions.  That warning struck Michael Jacobson, who served as counsel for the 9/11 Commission, as worthy of note.

MICHAEL JACOBSON: It’s interesting because there has been so much out there over the past year or so about how Al-Qaeda has really been crippled.  But to me it says that despite this and despite the fact that they may be on the run somewhat, the organization is still capable of conducting a real terrorist attack in the United States.

WERMAN: That’s despite the fact that several high profile figures in Al-Qaeda have defected in the past couple of years.  Michael Jacobsen recently wrote a study of their reasons for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. It’s called “Terrorist Dropouts: Learning from Those Who Have Left.”  Jacobsen says there’s a common misunderstanding about the recent departure of those key Al-Qaeda leaders.

JACOBSON: For many people they have thought that this was the first time that Al-Qaeda has been plagued by these kinds of defections. And if you actually look back at Al-Qaeda’s history, they’ve had some people leave the organization including seemingly committed members from the earliest days.  They had a few operatives from the 1990s defect from Al-Qaeda during their years in Sudan, and these individuals really provided a lot of what the U.S. government knew about Al-Qaeda prior to the attacks.

WERMAN: Prior to the 9/11 attacks?

JACOBSON: Exactly.

WERMAN: Even in the 9/11 attacks there was a defection there as well.

JACOBSON: Yes, I think most of the focus has been on how Al-Qaeda managed to convince 19 individuals to sign up for an operation that they knew would end up in their certain death. And I think what received a lot less attention was that Al-Qaeda actually had people who had been selected for the plot sent back to Saudi Arabia to get visas for the United States.  And then when they were back in their home countries of Saudi Arabia chose at that point not to go through with the plot.  And in some cases, this was in spite of pressure from Al-Qaeda to convince them to rejoin.

WERMAN: So from what you’ve researched is there a common thread that motivates people to leave Al-Qaeda?

JACOBSON: I think their reasons can differ somewhat depending on whether or not you’re talking about a leader or a lower level operative.  I think if you look at some of the leaders and ideologues who have defected recently, I think they’ve been concerned with Al-Qaeda’s direction at the strategic level.  Are they inaccurately interpreting Islam in their view, concerned that Al-Qaeda is really headed in the wrong direction over all and is bringing too much negative attention to the cause.  But I think if you look at some of the lower level operatives, there are a lot more petty reasons that you see that result in people leaving.

Some of the people from the 1990s, one of them got very upset because he found out that the Egyptians and Al-Qaeda were being paid far more than he was.  He thought they were being treated much better than he was. He started embezzling money from Al-Qaeda. He embezzled about $100,000 from Al-Qaeda.  Bin Laden finds out, asks him to repay the money. He repays part of it and then chooses to leave. And so it really sounded like the kind of normal personal stuff that you hear in everyday life of somebody who feels like they didn’t receive the attention that they deserved.

WERMAN: Now, one of the high level defections you highlight is that of Syed Imam Al-Sharif, the former head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. You say he’s renounced Osama Bin Laden and actually written a book rejecting Al-Qaeda.  Why does he reject Al-Qaeda, and what does he now advocate for?

JACOBSON: It’s interesting because Dr. Fadl has not completely renounced Jihad overall. I think his point now is that there’s the right context time for it, and that Al-Qaeda with its idea of global Jihad has gone too far. And what I think is particularly interesting about Dr. Fadl is he wrote this book from an Egyptian prison, which Al-Qaeda leadership has pointed out to say this guy might be doing this voluntarily and is doing this under the thumb of the Egyptian authorities. And I think despite that, it still has had a big impact, and we’ve really seen a lot of defensiveness on the part of Al-Qaeda to Dr. Fadl’s book. So when this big a figure turns against them, I think it’s a big deal.

WERMAN: So what happens to these defectives?  I mean, I think of all the stereotypes about people who, you know, become part of the mob and can never leave it.  Does the same apply with Al-Qaeda?  Will the come back to hunt you down?

JACOBSON: It was pretty surprising to me in the course of the of the reasons for the study to find out that people really can leave Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations without repercussions.  The individual, Jamal Al-Fadl,  who embezzled $100,000 from Al-Qaeda when Bin Laden found out he just said to him, “Please repay it.”  And that was the extent of the punishment before he left.  The two individuals who dropped out of the 9/11 plot, Al-Qaeda sent people to Saudi Arabia to try to convince them to rejoin, and when they didn’t they left them alone.  And this is pretty surprising particularly in the 9/11 example when somebody who knows some details about a major upcoming operation that they would not regard that as a major security risk, and that they just left them alone.

WERMAN: Michael Jacobson, Senior Fellow with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.  I appreciate it.  Thank you.

JACOBSON: Thank you.

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