Latest Editions

Coercion and concessions

Audio: Play | Download

Audio clip: Adobe Flash Player (version 9 or above) is required to play this audio clip. Download the latest version here. You also need to have JavaScript enabled in your browser.

Download MP3
Daniel Byman with the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University tells anchor Marco Werman that Washington should use coercion and concessions to prevent Hamas from torpedoing the new round of peace talks that get under way next week.

Read the Transcript
This text below is a phonetic transcript of a radio story broadcast by PRI’s THE WORLD. It has been created on deadline by a contractor for PRI. The transcript is included here to facilitate internet searches for audio content. Please report any transcribing errors to theworld@pri.org. This transcript may not be in its final form, and it may be updated. Please be aware that the authoritative record of material distributed by PRI’s THE WORLD is the program audio.

MARCO WERMAN: Daniel Byman is with the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. As we’ve just heard, Daniel, in that piece by correspondent Matthew Bell, at least some Hamas leaders say their organization wants to negotiate peace. What do you think? Do you really believe Hamas wants to negotiate?

DANIEL BYMAN:  Some Hamas leaders have shown flexibility, but the flip side is that some have not. And as a result the organization is not united on this issue. The bigger question is not would Hamas talk peace, but rather under what conditions would Hamas talk peace. What would Israel have to give up or accept before the talks would even occur? What would moderates associated with the Palestinian authority have to agree to? And here Hamas seems to be demanding a very high price and it’s uncertain if, even in the end, Hamas would agree to talk if this price were met.

WERMAN:  Tell me what that price is.

BYMAN: I’m not sure Hamas knows. Hamas talks about the talks having to recognize Palestinian dignity, about having to make a tremendous concession on issues such as Jerusalem or borders. But it really seems that Hamas is trying to get the best of both worlds. It wants to display a moderate face to potential donors, to those Palestinians who do favor peace talks, yet at the same time it wants to be a champion of resistance to show hardliners within the organization that it’s standing up to Israel and in general to capitalize on the image of resistance on which its built its popularity over the years.

WERMAN: For one reason or another, President Obama has followed President Bush’s policy on Hamas. But you maintain that although shunning Hamas may seem morally appropriate and politically safe, that policy is going to undermine Israel’s peace talks. Why?

BYMAN: You cannot have peace without Hamas. Hamas is a huge voice within the Palestinian national movement and even more importantly Hamas has shown that it can destroy peace talks with moderate Palestinians. Hamas can defer peace talks in two ways. First, simply by criticizing any concessions that someone like PA leader Abbas makes. It can make him look weak politically, it can describe him as a sell-out. And when many Palestinians are suspicious of talks in the first place, that’s a very powerful criticism. The even more dangerous option is that if peace talks get going and do have a momentum, Hamas can fire rockets or otherwise use violence to disrupt the talks.

WERMAN: Before we get to that dire situation, I mean what is the alternative to shunning Hamas? I mean trying to cut a deal with a group whose charter calls for the destruction of Israel?

BYMAN: Effectively, Israel has tried to cut a deal, but in a very tacit way. And the key is to step that up if you will, which is Hamas, even though it is strongly opposed to Israel, also wants to govern the Gaza Strip. And Israel and the international community need to take advantage of this desire. To try and offer to make conditions better in Gaza, to ease further the restrictions on Gaza, and to give Hamas a better chance of governing Gaza in exchange for it really staying on the sidelines in these peace talks. I think it’s unrealistic to expect Hamas to participate directly, but the goal is to really stop Hamas from torpedoing the talks and to do so it will be a mix of concession, but also if, with support from the international community, the threat of further Israel force.

WERMAN: What you’re saying hinges a lot on the more pragmatic voices, the moderate voices in Hamas holding sway. But isn’t likely that those moderate voices are just going to get drowned out?

BYMAN: It’s certainly possible the moderate voices will be drowned out. That’s why they need to have a stronger position. There needs to be the possibility of easing life in Gaza, easing the [SOUNDS LIKE] scene somewhat so. They have something that they can claim internally that they’ll get if they do stay on the sidelines and don’t defer the peace talks. And at the same time the international community needs to back Israel if Hamas does disrupt the peace talks. There needs to be a threat that will keep the more violent elements of Hamas in line.

WERMAN:  Daniel Byman, with the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Thanks very much for your time indeed.

BYMAN: Thanks for having me.

Copyright ©2009 PRI’s THE WORLD. All rights reserved. No quotes from the materials contained herein may be used in any media without attribution to PRI’s THE WORLD. This transcript may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, without prior written permission. For further information, please email The World’s Permissions Coordinator at theworld@pri.org.