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Bridge on the White Drin river (Photo: Shkelzen Rexha)
As Washington contemplates its alliance with rebels in Libya, Kosovo offers a cautionary tale. Journalist Matt McAllester talks to host Marco Werman about his new Kosovo expose. He describes how the rebels who were backed by Washington in the late 90s have morphed into a government with alleged links to organized crime. Download MP3
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Marco Werman: There’s much anxiety in Washington about who the rebels in Libya really are, and that is fueling the debate over whether to arm the rebels or not. The U.S. experience in Kosovo offers a cautionary tale. In 1999 Yugoslav forces, led by Slobodan Milosevic, were waging a war of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. In response, Washington and NATO launched an air campaign and backed the rebels of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Milosovic was forced to back off, the rebels were victorious, and their leaders have gone on to run Kosovo. But those leaders are no longer seen as freedom fighters. It’s alleged they are more like gangsters, operating what amounts to an organized crime syndicate involved in murder and the trafficking of women, narcotics, and even human organs. GlobalPost.com is running a three-part investigative report this week called “Kosovo’s Mafia.” Matt McAllister wrote the series. Matt, tell us about the man who runs Kosovo these days. His name is Hashim Thaci. He became a U.S. ally in a time of war. What are some of the allegations haunting him these days?
Matt McAllister: Well, these allegations are that he is essentially the mafia boss of Kosovo and has been for many years, albeit in coordination with some of his close associates, all of them former senior KLA figures. And Thaci, in 1998 and ’99, in the runup to the war, was the political leader of the KLA. He was the guy that Madeleine Albright would talk to and he persuaded the U.S., essentially, that he was a man they could deal with.
Werman: And the U.S. believed that two decades later, despite these allegations of crime that you investigate in your report. He remains pretty close to Washington. You go a step further to argue that the U.S. and its allies knew about these criminal allegations but they ignored them. How do you know that they knew?
McAllister: Because I have five NATO intelligence reports stretching back to 2000, all of which have very detailed allegations. Now these are allegations. It’s important to emphasize that. Nevertheless, they are extraordinarily detailed and it really wasn’t a secret. It was an open secret in Washington, in Europe, elsewhere, that many of the guys who formed the nexus, the core of the KLA, were originally drug runners, people smugglers, weapons smugglers, and somewhat violent characters. And these allegations have continued and merely gained momentum in the 12 years since the war.
Werman: Well, we’ll hear more about the details of your exposé in just a moment, Matt. But first I have to ask you this. The intervention in Kosovo was framed as a war of humanitarian intervention, as we said, not unlike Libya, in some respects. So, as you watch what is happening in Libya right now, what about the Kosovo experience do you think is relevant right now?
McAllister: The key difference, I think, in Libya, is that we don’t really know who the rebels are. And I’m not sure the rebels themselves quite know who they are or who their leaders are or what their goals are, beyond getting rid of Gaddafi. In Kosovo, in the runup to the war, there were two distinct organizations that were inevitably going to pretty much take over the running of Kosovo. That was the KLA and there was also a Kosovar government in exile run by another, less inclined to violent uprising than the KLA were. And so after the war, which was inevitably successful, I mean, it’s very hard to beat NATO airpower, we knew pretty much who was going to take over. The other key thing that I’m seeing is a sense of impatience. The conflict in Libya involving the West, NATO planes, is very recent. And I remember a few weeks into the Kosovo conflict, the bombing, people starting to says, “Well when is this going to end?” And it takes a while to dislodge someone as militarily established as Milosevic or Gaddafi.
Werman: Now, a lot of your evidence from your investigation points to this government being kind of like a Mafia organization. So how well did the U.S. know the KLA?
McAllister: I think they knew, but it was a question of the lesser of two evils, and diplomacy is a messy, complicated, imperfect business. They knew who they were dealing with, but on the other side of the fence, was Slobodan Milosovic, who was – this was his last gasp in years of brutality, ethnic cleansing, aggression. And so the KLA seemed like a good option. Was it the ideal option? Absolutely not. And I think the very few people, who even though they have seen what has happened in Kosovo over the last 12 years, would say that that intervention was a mistake. I don’t think many people would say that. And I think the key problem is, okay, you support these guys. Inevitably they are going to be very domestically popular after the war. But the U.S. embassy, unlike some embassies in the world, is astonishingly powerful in Kosovo. It really is. And it can somewhat make or break politicians. And there was very little if any attempt, that I am aware of, to somewhat apply pressure on Hashim Thaci and other senior former KLA leaders to clean up their act. There has been lip service. I know that the vice president told Thaci in July, when Thaci was at the White House, to clean up his act. But it is somewhat so entrenched now and one of the theories is that Thaci’s associates know so much about him that he can’t abandon them or string them out to dry.
Werman: Matt McAllister has authored a three-part series at GlobalPost.com. It’s called Kosovo’s Mafia. You’ll find the link at our website. Matt McAllister, thank you very much.
McAllister: Thank you.
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