A nuclear scientist is killed after a suspected bomb exploded in a car in northern Tehran, the latest in a string of such nuclear-linked attacks.

Alfredo Corchado, a correspondent for the Dallas Morning News tells host Marco Werman about the long reach of Mexican drug cartels in the US.

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Marco Werman: I’m Marco Werman and this is The World, a coproduction of the BBC World Service, PRI and WGBH Boston. Mexico’s brutal drug cartels like to broaden their operations, unfortunately. They’ve exported their traffic and violence to Central America, for instance. They moved into the people smuggling business too by controlling the movement of illegal immigrants into the United States. But it’s still surprising to hear US officials say that a Mexican drug cartel was involved in the alleged Iranian plot to kill the Saudi ambassador in Washington. The plot supposedly called for the Zetas cartel to carry out the actual murder. Alfredo Corchado covers Mexico’s drug cartels as a correspondent for the Dallas Morning News. He’s in Juarez, Mexico right now. Corchado says Zetas hit men have a reputation for being ruthless.

Alfredo Corchado: They’re not shy about murdering people, they’re not shy about beheading or brutality, but they usually do this on Mexican territory or in a country with very weak judicial systems at all aim of protecting their criminal enterprise. To do a murder for an alleged $1.5 million in the United States is pretty bizarre.

Werman: Well, we know that the Mexican cartels have crept into the US, but what are their actual on-the-ground capabilities in the US in places like Washington that might make this sort of plot possible?

Corchado: Well, they’re very sophisticated when it comes to operating within Mexican limits or you know, in Central America where there’s [inaudible 1:27]. They have ties all over the world, but that’s what makes this thing so bizarre is why would the Zetas you know, they’re part of a $40 billion industry, I mean why would they take $1.5 million to go to Washington, DC and blowup some restaurant or something?

Werman: Would the Mexican drug lords take that sort of gamble and risk antagonizing the US government with an assassination plot?

Corchado: Mexican cartels for the last few years have been you know, under a lot of pressure by the Calderon government, often times with the help of the US government. The Zetas in particular are being targeted by not just the government itself, but also by paramilitary groups. That’s why you know, passing into the United States to create this kind of mayhem just sounds very, very impossible.

Werman: Alfredo, you follow the drug cartels as a reporter and the Zetas are among the most notorious if not the most notorious, as far as their presence in the United States, what is that like? I mean how deep do they penetrate and what are their numbers here like?

Corchado: We don’t know exactly about numbers, I mean in Mexico there’s talk there may be in the 15,000 range. You’re talking about hit men, you’re talking about lookouts, the support groups. In the United States you hear a lot about elements of the Zetas, people who work for the Zetas like gang members. In the Texas area we have reported on assassinations, whether it’s Dallas, whether it’s San Antonio, whether it’s Houston, but these are assassinations that are carefully planned out by the Zetas to protect their business interests. We haven’t you know, heard anything about them being involved or interested in anything other than that.

Werman: What are Mexicans saying today about this?

Corchado: The Mexicans are waiting for the Zetas to come out with one of those famous you know, signs. I mean the way they communicate with the public is they put out what they call [speaking Spanish], which is a handwritten note that says yes, we did this, or no, we didn’t do that. So Mexicans are eagerly awaiting for the sign on some bridge along the Mexican border that says we had nothing the Iranians you know. And many sources I’ve talked to have been you know, logging onto the computers and looking at these narco blogs waiting for something to come up on the Zetas. I mean we’re all eagerly waiting to see what they have to say about this. You know, and it also makes you question who the informant is and we’ll probably never know that. Was he a high ranking member of the Zetas or just someone who claims to have known the Zetas? There’s a lot of details that we still don’t know.

Werman: How do you think this is gonna change the US assistance and attention on the drug war and helping Mexico fight the cartels?

Corchado: I think in some ways it helps the Americans make the argument that what happens south of the border is something that Americans need to be worried about. It brings up this notion that there really isn’t that much difference between a terrorist group and a Mexican cartel group. The tactics used by cartels are not that different than those used by the terror groups, but again, up to now the Mexican cartels have shown no sign that they’re interested in political causes. For them it’s all about greed, it’s all about controlling territories, it’s all about controlling communities. But I think it makes the argument at least for mainstream America that what’s happening along the US-Mexico border and south of our border is something that should be paid attention to.

Werman: Alfredo Corchado, with the Dallas Morning News speaking with us from Juarez, Mexico. Thank you very much.

Corchado: My pleasure.

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Professor Guiora’s article in Foreign Policy

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This text below is a phonetic transcript of a radio story broadcast by PRI’s THE WORLD. It has been created on deadline by a contractor for PRI. The transcript is included here to facilitate internet searches for audio content. Please report any transcribing errors to theworld@pri.org. This transcript may not be in its final form, and it may be updated. Please be aware that the authoritative record of material distributed by PRI’s THE WORLD is the program audio.

JEB SHARP: One tactic Israel has used against Hamas in Gaza is the targeted killing of militant leaders. That’s a tactic the United States has used too against suspected terrorists in other parts of the world. We’ve heard recently about CIA plans to conduct targeted killings of senior Al-Qaeda members. Those plans were never used before CIA director Leon Panetta cancelled them last month. Amos Guiora was a legal advisor to the Israeli defense commander in Gaza from 1994 to 1997. In that capacity he gave legal advice on targeted killings. He says there are several legal and moral complexities to consider.

AMOS GUIORA: The most important aspect of targeted killings to understand is what I call a four-part analysis which requires us to think about international law; questions of morality; how we gather intelligence; and also how we determine effectiveness. Because at the end of the day what we’re talking about is the dilemma of the decision maker that the decision maker being the commander. He needs advice but at the end of the day it’s his call. But there are critical issues that go into that decision making and in order to make the most reasoned and cautious decision the commander needs to understand the limits of power. He needs to respect the limits of power. But he also needs to understand that operational counter terrorism requires making those very difficult decisions.

SHARP: The idea of a targeted killing is that one person is targeted but the reality is often that civilians get killed too. When you’re thinking about the issue of what makes a targeted killing legal how do you reconcile that with the fact that killing innocents is still wrong?

GUIORA: That’s an outstanding question. So first of all, international law talks about collateral damage. But it says that the commander must make every reasonable effort to minimize collateral damage which translates crassly and roughly into an understanding of the forefathers of international law that when you’re engaged in operational counter terrorism there’s always a chance that innocent civilians will be injured or killed. The requirement of the commander is obviously to minimize that. Nowhere does it say that there can be no loss of life amongst innocent civilians. That said it is clearly one of the considerations or calculations of making the decisions. You know the hit will be done in such a way that the person will be in that particular moment not surrounded by innocents. Obviously there clearly have been examples where the target killing has gone forward and as a result of which innocent civilians were killed and then that obviously raises important legal and moral questions.

SHARP: You are dealing with a military program aimed at stopping suicide bombings but here in the US now we’re talking about a CIA program targeting terrorists overseas. How are these situations different from each other?

GUIORA: Well I think if we think about the CIA program that the first question we would have to ask ourselves is whether or not it’s future preventive, predicated or retribution predicated. I would argue, without knowing all the facts of the CIA program, but I would suggest that if the plan was retribution based killing somebody for an act done in the past without any intelligence information suggesting future activity that kind of program would not meet my four-part test. On the other hand if the program was intended to prevent future acts of terrorism based on intelligence information that reliable, credible, viable, and valid then I would say that would meet international law standards. So the fundamental question which needs to be asked is whether or not the program is future based or past based.

SHARP: Why do you think CIA director Leon Panetta shut the American program down?

GUIORA: As far as I can tell from you know what one reads and what one hears because I think there was concern exactly on that issue was that past or future what kind of intelligence had been gathered and whether it really was preventive or more retribution based. And I think maybe, again based only what I’ve been able to read, that there was maybe concern as to whether or not congress had been fully kept abreast of the program which raises other equally significant questions in the American paradigm in terms of checks and balances and separation of powers in terms of when does the executive have to confer with the congress.

SHARP: Yeah that’s interesting that the controversy seems to focus on the secrecy of the program and yet there are all these larger issues to discuss. I mean what do you think is the main issue that should discussed in reference to this apparent program?

GUIORA: Well I think that almost eight years after 9/11 the time has come for the American public to begin – underline the word begin – having a serious discussion about what are America’s counter terrorism policies. I would suggest that eight years later we really haven’t had that discussion. We’ve had maybe discussions about tactics but I don’t think we’ve had the kind of sophisticated candid discussion about strategy and policy. And I think you’re absolutely right the response seems to be to cancel the program because congress wasn’t briefed or congress is upset because congress wasn’t briefed. That’s not the issue. And we’ve never really engaged in that very, very difficult discussion about what exactly are we trying to do and what are the limits of what we’re trying to do.

SHARP: Amos Guiora is a professor of law at the University of Utah. He served in the Israeli defense forces judge advocate general’s core for 19 years. Thanks so much for talking to us.

GUIORA: Thank you so much for having me.

Copyright ©2009 PRI’s THE WORLD. All rights reserved. No quotes from the materials contained herein may be used in any media without attribution to PRI’s THE WORLD. This transcript may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, without prior written permission. For further information, please email The World’s Permissions Coordinator at theworld@pri.org.