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The text below is a phonetic transcript of a radio story broadcast by PRI’s THE WORLD. It has been created on deadline by a contractor for PRI. The transcript is included here to facilitate internet searches for audio content. Please report any transcribing errors to theworld@pri.org. This transcript may not be in its final form, and it may be updated. Please be aware that the authoritative record of material distributed by PRI’s THE WORLD is the program audio.

Marco Werman: I’m Marco Werman. This is The World. Iran’s President says his country will not budge one iota on its controversial nuclear program. That program is back in the spotlight thanks to a new report by the UN’s Nuclear Agency. The IAEA says there is credible evidence that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The Iranian government continues to insist that its nuclear program is peaceful. The new report has led to fresh calls to strengthen international sanctions against Iran. Karim Sadjadpour is an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He says the report might complicate Tehran’s relationship with its allies.

Karim Sadjadpour: This report is going to make it more difficult for Russia and China to continue to vouch for Iran’s peaceful nuclear intentions, but I think Russia and China will continue to argue that the only way to resolve this issue is diplomacy, not coercion. So, I don’t see the basic facts on the ground changing. What I would further argue is that, for those who are cynical about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, no additional proof is necessary. And for those who are cynical about American intentions vis-a -vis Iran, no additional proof is sufficient.

Werman: That sounds like the eternal standoff. I mean, stepping back, what will it take in the long run for the US and the Iranians to sit down?

Sadjadpour: I think the challenge you have from the vantage point of the US government is that you’re dealing with a regime in Tehran who sees their opposition to the United States as central to their identity. I think there are now 3 symbolic pillars of their identity as a regime, and that’s animosity towards the United States, animosity towards Israel, and the veil – the hijab for women. So, I think the challenge for the US government is how do you go about reaching a modus vivendi; how do you reach a rapprochement with a regime in Tehran which needs you as an adversary? And that’s the challenge for any US government whether you are Republican or Democrat. So, my sense is that moving forward US policy towards Iran is going to increasingly resemble US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union in the 1980′s. I think the challenge will be to contain our dispute with Iran, contain Iran itself until the regime is eventually forced to change under the weight of its own internal contradictions and economic malaise, or the regime essentially changes like we’ve seen in parts of the Arab world now.

Werman: Will this report and the reaction to it from the West accentuate the deep internal divisions among Iran’s rulers? I’m wondering if there are divisions over what this report says in the Iranian street, as well.

Sadjadpour: There was a very telling moment after the US-led or the NATO-led intervention in Libya. The Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei gave a speech, and he said that Muammar Gaddafi’s main mistake was giving up his nuclear program, because when he gave up his nuclear program he made himself vulnerable to this NATO intervention. So, sometimes when you read between the lines of Iranian officials, you get a sense that they believe that if they were to acquire nuclear weapon it would actually alleviate the pressure against them rather than augment it. When it comes to the Iranian people – the proverbial Iranian street- there hasn’t been any open debate about the cost and benefits of this nuclear program. I think if they were…

Werman: And that’s because they don’t care, or because there is no disagreement?

Sadjadpour: The way the Iranian government has framed this issue is that the “Imperialist West” wants to deprive Iran of this wonderful civilian nuclear energy technology. The reality is that this nuclear program for Iran has had enormous costs – tens of billions of dollars of sunk costs, not to mention the tens of billions of dollars that Iran has lost from sanctions. But, I think very few Iranians have been aware of that cost-benefit analysis. And, as a former Iranian official once put it several years ago – he said that if you were to ask the average Iranian whether they want a nuclear program, everyone would say yes; and if you were to ask the follow-up and say, “Okay, well what is exactly a nuclear program?”, very few people would be able to explain to you what it is. That’s the testament to the way the regime has limited information. And it’s also a testament to Iranian nationalism and the sense that, historically, the great powers of the world, be it Britain, the United States, Russia, have wanted to keep Iran down for their own benefit. I don’t think that’s true anymore, but that narrative still has a lot of currency within the Iranian body politic.

Werman: Karim Sadjadpour, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, speaking with us from Washington. Thanks very much.

Sadjadpour: My pleasure. Thank you.

Copyright ©2009 PRI’s THE WORLD. All rights reserved. No quotes from the materials contained herein may be used in any media without attribution to PRI’s THE WORLD. This transcript may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, without prior written permission. For further information, please email The World’s Permissions Coordinator at theworld@pri.org.

Read the Transcript
The text below is a phonetic transcript of a radio story broadcast by PRI’s THE WORLD. It has been created on deadline by a contractor for PRI. The transcript is included here to facilitate internet searches for audio content. Please report any transcribing errors to theworld@pri.org. This transcript may not be in its final form, and it may be updated. Please be aware that the authoritative record of material distributed by PRI’s THE WORLD is the program audio.

Marco Werman: Hans Blix is a former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and was the UN’s chief weapons inspector for Iraq prior to 2003. He’s at home in Sweden. Having read the report, Hans Blix, do you think the evidence is conclusive that Iran has carried out “activities relevant to the development of a nuclear device”?

Hans Blix: Yes, I think the report is much more detailed and convincing, and it’s also assessed. And so, while earlier you had the tendency to say that this raises questions, now they have actually assessed it and they say that the evidence is credible. They do not draw the conclusion that Iran will make a bomb, they simply…the evidence shows amply that they had activities that moved them closer to the bomb option.

Werman: This is in contrast to the US assessment in 2007 which said that the nuclear program was essentially closed down with some minor enriching going on. So, it sounds clear to you that this work is still continuing?

Blix: Well, what the Agency says is that before 2003 they can identify a structured program and after that, lesser so. But still, they faced a number of activities after 2003 and even continuing now. So, it doesn’t really directly contradict the US conclusions, but it’s perhaps more nuance in suggesting that, yes, things did continue after 2003 – perhaps not at the same level and intensity.

Werman: The IAEA has a history of being very cautious. It was skeptical of the evidence presented by the Bush Administration on Iraq during that crisis and lead-up to that. How confident are you that the Agency that you used to direct is keeping the same standards?

Blix: Well, I am not in it now so I can’t really judge with absolute certainty, but the tradition of being cautious, I think, is right. We certainly learned in the Iraq case, when we were in New York, that it was highly justified. Because intelligence agencies come up with all kinds of findings and they want to draw conclusions and they know that the Agency has a higher credibility than they do. So, they would love the Agency to, sort of, embrace this evidence and embrace that conclusion and make it their own. The Agency has to be cautious. I mean, in the case of Iraq, you will remember that we had the story about the contract concluded between Iraq and Niger, and it turned out to be a forgery. We had the aluminum tubes that were said to be for enrichment purposes, and they turned out to be for something else. So, I think they just have been wise in being very cautious. But this time, there’s a lot of evidence they’ve referred to come fairly to rather long ago and they have been accessing carefully. I think it makes this early credible impression much more solid than I had thought.

Werman: What kind of pressure do you come under from foreign governments, as head of the IAEA, to tailor reports one way or the other? It seems like there must be some pressure.

Blix: Yes. The governments will push if they have a policy that they would like to slam on various sanctions and they would hope that their findings would be suitable to underpin that. I think that the Agency’s standing in the world depends upon it being very judicious, and I think they have been so, as far as I can judge. That makes it the more serious what they are coming with now. It feels fairly cautious and very calm in language, but you do get the impression that yes, Iran is moving forward and not to the same structured way as before. But anyway, they are moving closer to weapons option. Whether they actually will manufacture a weapon, no, this doesn’t say; nor it that necessary. I think it’s a bit of an obsession about asking it, do they have the weapon next year or next month, or two years from now. Then I think the most important question is – what is the world to do about it? How is the world to react to this?

Werman: Hans Blix, former weapons inspector and former head of the IAEA, speaking with us from Sweden. Thanks very much for your time.

Blix: You’re welcome. Bye-bye.

Copyright ©2009 PRI’s THE WORLD. All rights reserved. No quotes from the materials contained herein may be used in any media without attribution to PRI’s THE WORLD. This transcript may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, without prior written permission. For further information, please email The World’s Permissions Coordinator at theworld@pri.org.

And it’s expected to be highly critical of Iranian intentions.

Iran said the leaked contents of the International Atomic Energy Agency report are “fabrications.”

But the episode has already fuelled speculation that the Israelis might consider bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Israelis across the political spectrum have long considered Iran’s nuclear program to be a grave threat. And Israeli leaders have long alluded to the necessity of using military action. But news reports suggest this time, an attack could be imminent. Today, Israel’s finance minister Yuval Steinitz said he hoped the forthcoming UN report would finally bring the gravity of the Iranian nuclear threat into focus for the international community.

“We know it already for 15 years, it is very clear and now it is going to be crystal clear to the entire world. And therefore Iran is producing the most dangerous threat, not just to Israel and the Middle East, but to Europe, the United States and the rest of the world, and it’s up to the world to do its utmost.”

“Israel is trying to convince the world. But the question is, is there anything behind these threats? And I would say, yes,” said Ronen Bergman, a military affairs analyst at the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth.

Bergman said Israel is sending the message that if the world does not prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, then Israel will take matters into its own hands.

“I would say that Israel, as a last resort, if it is convinced that the world is not going to take serious actions against Iran, the Israeli prime minister – not just Netanyahu – I think any Israeli prime minister would launch the bombers to hit the Iranian nuclear sites,” Bergman said.

The new US defense secretary just paid a visit to Israel. And Leon Panetta said something publicly that was perceived here as a word of caution to prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Panetta said that when it comes to decisions about Iran, things need to be coordinated between the Israeli and US governments. Nicholas Burns is former undersecretary of state who worked on Iran policy under president George W. Bush.

“If Israel were to strike unilaterally, it would almost by definition drag the US into a war. Iran’s going to respond,” Burns said. “I think Iran would like nothing than to get into a war with Israel. We’d have to support Israel. So it’s very important that the US have an agreement with Israel: “we’ve got this one. We’ve got your back. We’ll protect you. But don’t drag us into a war that’s not of our choosing.”

The Israeli public and political leadership is deeply divided on this issue.

A former head of Israel’s Mossad spy agency, Meir Dagan, caused a huge stir when he said early this year, that bombing Iran was, quote, the “stupidest thing” he’s ever heard. Jeffrey Goldberg is national correspondent with The Atlantic.

He said several former Israeli intelligence and military officials fear that prime minister Netanyahu, along with his defense minister Ehud Barak, are ready to strike Iran. And that there’s no one left in the upper echelons of power to advise them against doing so.

“Ultimately, if the prime minister and the defense minister tell the Israeli air force to attack Iran, it will attack Iran,” Goldberg said. “It has plans. It has practiced for this. It believes, like any good air force, that it can do anything. And so, this will happen if the prime minister decides that it will happen.”

Goldberg agrees that some of what’s going on here is public posturing on the part of the Israeli government. This is aimed at getting the US and allies to hit Iran with tougher sanctions. But he adds that the Israeli prime minister is also completely sincere when he talks about the need to stop Iran going from nuclear.

Fukushima nuclear power plant following the March 11 earthquake & tsunami. (Photo: daveeza/Flickr)

Nowhere near Chernobyl. Except sort of. But really, much, much less bad. Or… maybe worse.

If your head’s hurting right now trying to keep track of official evaluations of the scale of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, well, get in line for the aspirin. If not yet the iodine pills.

For weeks we’ve been told that the still out-of-control nuclear mess at the Fukushima-Daiichi plant would ultimately come nowhere near the scale of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. (I wrote about this comparison—and its shortcomings—last week.) The Japanese government, for instance, had rated the accident at level 5 on the IAES’s International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale—an “accident with wider consequences,” roughly on par with the scary but ultimately fairly limited Three Mile Island event in 1979.

Then, Tuesday, we here in the US awoke to news that Japan has re-evaluated the amount of radiation released so far, and has recalibrated the disaster as a 7—top of the IAEA’s scale, a “major accident,” and a level previously reached only by… Chernobyl.

The announcement was widely reported in leads and top graphs in ways that strongly suggested Fukushima is, in fact, comparable to Chernobyl. (See NYTimes, NPR, Kyodo News, NHK.)

Yikes.

But hold on, they told those of us who weren’t too stunned to listen or read further, Fukushima still has released only about a tenth of the total radiation released at Chernobyl. So even if it’s on the same level as Chernobyl it’s still “totally different from Chernobyl,” according to an official of Japan’s nuclear agency.

OK, so it’s the same, but actually not at all the same.

Turns out the confusion partly results from an imprecise measurement system that doesn’t distinguish between events on the top end of the scale. And there IS a very important distinction here—between a Chernobyl reactor without a containment vessel that exploded and burned for two days, spewing high levels of radiation over thousands of square miles, and the four reactors at Fukushima that have so far suffered much less damage and the impact of which has been much more localized.

Except… on the heels of the government’s announcement that Fukushima is not on par with Chernobyl came this, from an executive of the Plant’s owner, Tokyo Electric Power:

“Our concern is that it could eventually exceed Chernobyl.”

Huh?

Aside from that single quote from TEPCO’s Junichi Matsumoto, I haven’t been able to unearth any more details about this statement, certainly nothing about the level of probability behind it. And the same Japanese nuclear official who said Fukushima is totally different from Chernobyl, despite the top-level crisis rating, told the New York Times, “I cannot understand their position.”

So for the time being we’re again left in the dark. Which has been one of the biggest problems of this whole crisis—a dearth of detailed and reliable information, or context for the information we do have.

Some of this may be impossible to get for years, if ever—many instruments are broken or unreliable after the quake and tsunami, and the reactor cores are still too hot to for anyone to be able to assess them directly. It’s also impossible to measure radiation in every possible place it could have ended up. But some information may also have been withheld or massaged by TEPCO or the Japanese government, which has been wrestling with the challenge of how to manage the situation without causing panic among its people.

As I said, we do know that the dynamics of the Chernobyl incident were very different from those at Fukushima. We also know that Fukushima has been managed far better than the Soviets handled Chernobyl (not well, perhaps, but still far better). That means many fewer people have so far received acute doses of radiation this time, and that the fallout from the airborne releases seem to be much less and far more localized. And the Japanese government says that a month now into the crisis, the chances of another large burst of radiation are “significantly smaller.”

But we also know that along with the airborne releases, large amounts of radioactivity have seeped into the ground and been released into the sea, much of which, it seems, is as yet uncounted. And of course the disaster is still far from over. Radiation may continue to escape for weeks or months to come.

And amid the mixed signals, here’s one more: even as the risk of significant new releases seems to be diminishing, the Japanese government this week expanded the evacuation zone around the plant to include new areas where residents are likely to receive long-term elevated radiation exposure. It’s also becoming increasingly clear that some of these areas will be uninhabitable for at least several decades to come.

So—Fukushima like Chernobyl? Fukushima NOT like Chernobyl? I still believe the comparison is inappropriate no matter how the numbers do or don’t stack up (Are we comparing the nature of the accident? Total radiation released? Area affected? Total impact on human health?) But it’s clearer than ever this week that that’s a losing rhetorical battle, even as it’s also clear that the comparisons are more meaningless than ever.

But I sure do hope that at the very least, the IAEA will change its scale before the next nuclear disaster—this is becoming harder than ever to characterize for a general audience.

If they don’t, we’ll know that they really are in cahoots—not with the nuclear industry, as many allege, but with the aspirin manufacturers.

We say farewell to 2010 with a quintessential episode of The World’s Technology Podcast. In other words, we circle the globe and bring you the tech stories you don’t hear anywhere else. Our highlight this week is a look at some new robotic technologies out of Japan that are assisting the disabled. One is a kind of exo-skeleton that is allowing a stroke victim to walk again. Another is a robot that will help the blind take a walk. The BBC’s Rolad Buerk reports from Japan. You can see a video version of Roland’s story, or read more about the robots he profiled. Also, we will return to Haiti almost a year after a devastating earthquake to hear about a plan to use banking via mobile phone as a way to assist in the ongoing recovery. And you can read more about Mercy Corps’ pilot mobile banking program in Haiti. Then, we’ll set off to Cuba to hear about the island nation’s homegrown answer to Wikipedia, called EcuRed. Along the way, we’ll also hear about efforts to make networks of both computers, and humans, a bit smarter when it comes to making decisions. Hint: it involves something called human-agent collectives, not SkyNet.

And finally, we’ll take a look at some inspector gadgets. The inspectors in question are a class of new recruits at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. And the gadgets are designed to help them detect weapons. You can even check out a slideshow of the gadgets.

Remember, you can follow us on Twitter and Facebook

This hand-held gadget sets off a beep on sensing uranium (Photo: Gerry Hadden)

The 18 recruits in this year’s weapons inspector training course spent their first couple of months studying the history and legal framework of the IAEA’s mission. Now they’re up to their eyebrows in beeps and whistles.

The handheld devices are about the size of ping pong paddles but they sound like an old fashioned Atari game…Pong maybe. But a weapons inspector trainee from Australia, identified as Y, explains just how sophisticated these tools are. He moves the black instrument slowly over a desk until he reaches a small, radioactive disk to see if he can find a radioactive source.

“I just do a sweep of the area and once you hear a tone, then you’ve found your source.”

This is just one of the gizmos that the future inspectors are getting comfortable with. There are sodium iodine detectors, uranium isotope analysers, and spontaneous plutonium fission meters. Recruit Y said mastering it all is a challenge.

“Just learning how to use some of this stuff is mind blowing,” he said. “Some of the physics behind it, you have to sit there for two weeks just to absorb it. And then you get to play with it.”

These inspectors are also learning how to install and use on-site surveillance cameras. The cameras are to make sure nuclear materials don’t move or disappear…say from a room where enriched uranium is stored. The aspiring inspectors are also learning how to ensure the integrity of the cameras.

The typical field camera is covered by a metal, screw-on casing. Then you can seal it in any number of ways. One seal is like a metal bottlecap that has random scratches and marks inside it that make it impossible to copy.

Another uses fiber – optic cables that stop transmitting if the seal is cut or disconnected. The cameras and other devices aren’t exactly locked but another recruit, X, said they might as well be.

“They’re just sealed so that if somebody does tamper with it we’ll be able to find out,” X said. “The same goes with our electronics. If someone cuts the lines we’d know it.”

The future inspectors’ tools won’t be limited to what they can carry. There’s a sophisticated support network that stays right here in Vienna. Think of it as what air traffic control is to a pilot. The trainees are becoming intimately familiar with the Vienna based technology as well.

In a highly secure section of this vast UN complex, satellite imagery analyst Julien Elbez sits before a computer. If you thought Google Earth was impressive, Elbez’s software is in a different league. He says he and his team can examine every nuclear facility in the world from this control room.

“We are trying to look at a site from a global perspective,” Elbez said. “Where is it located? Is it close to a city, to transport network? All of this is important because nuclear work requires heavy systems that need transport.”

Elbez relays his concerns to the inspectors in the field.

When the inspectors arrive at the site in question, they will deploy their most trusted tool in the field. It looks like a mini handkerchief but all is it is a four-inch by four-inch cotton swipe because radioactive particles stick to cotton.

The inspectors will use the cotton swipes to wipe suspicious surfaces. Then they’ll send the swipes to another support facility — a laboratory about an hour outside Vienna.

That lab is a clean room environment — you have to pass through an air-shower before you enter. If you’d just gotten out of the shower, this would dry you off in about four seconds. Then you don a clean-suit and pass through a series of dust free chambers.

Lab director David Donohue said all of this is necessary to keep that little cotton swipe clean.

“Otherwise you might suspect some problems,” Donohue said. “Cross contamination. We’re similar to pharmaceutical or computer chip companies. That’s why we use clean rooms. The air is specially filtered, all furniture is specially chosen. People wear suits. All of this to stop cross-contamination.”

Here, Donohue’s team takes a cotton swipe sent in from the field and dissolves it in acid. A bit of residue remains and it could contain traces of uranium or plutonium. Donohue and his colleagues can find out what those particles are by shooting them through a multi-million dollar mass spectrometer.

“We’re looking for a needle in haystack; just a few particles of undeclared material amongst millions of declared particles,” Donohue said. “At a non-nuke facility, inspectors can swipe anywhere. In a parking lot, an office building, baby food factory, whatever. And by looking we can see whether someone handled uranium or plutonium in those places.”

Back in Vienna, many of the inspector trainees say they didn’t know they’d have such sophisticated support for their field work. Class recruit Y said that’s just another in a string of surprises as he learns how complex controlling nuclear proliferation is.

“You first come and think, oh, I’m just gonna do some inspections,” Y said. “It can’t be so hard. And then they say, ‘here’s the instrumentation’. And this is the paperwork and this is the system. So if you think you’re gonna just go out into the field, and it’s all good, you might be in for a shock.”

The UN weapons inspector trainees will soon feel that shock — or at least a simulated version of it. They’ll do a mock inspection at a live nuclear facility. It’ll be the ultimate test of their judgment, and their ability to work under pressure, before the real job begins.
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AUDIO EXTRA: These days the IAEA nuclear inspectors have wide authority to inspect not just declared nuclear facilities, but to investigate at large – whether that means a new construction site at an existing facility or some suspicious area far from a nuclear plant spotted via satellite imaging. Recruit X, an American nuclear engineer, says today’s inspectors aren’t just accountants verifying lists of declared materials. They’re sleuths who need to keep their eyes and ears open for the unexpected – and then act on their intuition.

When the subway car doors open at the Vienna International Center, crowds of well-dressed commuters rush onto the platform, all hustling in the same direction and at the same brisk pace. Like a foot race with briefcases. It reminds me of rush hour in my native New York, except that everything here is much cleaner. I follow the human flow out into a cold, drizzly morning. Everyone’s wearing I.D. badges on their coats. Because I’m not, because I’m a guest, I have to go through a special security search before entering the International Atomic Energy Agency’s headquarters. It’s like being at the airport. Coins, telephone, belt, anything metal into a plastic basket, then a pass through a security scanner. Followed by the usual questions about my odd gear, my microphones.

Once through security I rejoin the stream of employees and soon find myself before a circular formation of tall towers, with a round fountain before them. The fountain is ringed by country flags. Nearly every government in the world has a seat here. The place is huge.

I’d been told to head on up to the communications office, where the press folks were awaiting me.

“Excuse me,” I ask one of the international policemen on hand, ‘I’m looking for ‘communications.’”
“Which office is it?”
“Exactly.”
“There are five thousand offices in this complex,” the policeman says, shaking his head. “You, sir, are lacking some information.”

I agree and try the middle tower of the seven before me. It’s like choosing answer C on a multiple choice test. But my guess is wrong. I manage to get through on the phone to my press contact. She’s surprised I’ve gotten this far without an escort.

“Give me your coordinates, sit still, and someone will come fetch you.”

Her advice is sound, because you can’t even get beyond the elevator lobby on any floor, in any IAEA building, without a special badge that
you hold up to a scanner. Within the IAEA culture security reigns. For example, the press people can buzz me in to their offices, but not on to the floor where the Director General works. Or into the area where the inspector training is underway. We have to stand at the glass entry doors and wave someone on the inside over, miming for them to buzz us in. Then we have to identify ourselves. I should have thought to use my head at that point, because once we are inside an instructor informs the class of new inspectors that bathroom breaks will be problematic. Turns out we all lack bathroom clearance. As I mention in my radio piece, even relieving oneself at the IAEA requires an escort.

The need for such control at the IAEA is obvious. These are the folks out to stop nuclear proliferation. As such they’re sitting on lots of secrets. I don’t learn any, but I know they exist because each time I ask the experts for concrete examples of how rogue states try to cover up their nuclear funny business, I am met with silence. The message is clear. If we share with you the sneaky tricks for concealing weapons programs then the sneaks will know that we know. And we’d lose our advantage

That seems fair. And may I use the inspectors’ names? No. May I take their pictures? Not if their faces appear. And why not? Because our inspectors need a low profile, I’m told. The work they do isn’t under cover, but their snap inspections could, in theory, allow them to catch nuclear facility operators red-handedly mishandling uranium. The lower their profile, the less problems they’ll have in
the field.

On the first morning of this training course the 18 new inspectors stand and introduce themselves. They are all highly educated, with graduate degrees in nuclear engineering or chemistry or some related field. But what they most seem to have in common, as this course kicks off, is a sense that they’re about to do some good in the world. For that sense of well-being they’re sacrificing a lot: much higher salaries in the private sector, a stable home life (inspectors are on the road more than half of their time). But those willing to be interviewed tell me that it’s worth it. One inspector says proudly that when his friends ask him about his career change, he tells them, “You know those U.N. weapons inspectors you see on TV? I’m going to be one of them.”

More reports from Gerry Hadden
• European workers protest austerity measures
• Limits of endangered species treaty debated

North Korea walked away from six-party nuclear talks earlier this year, but then said it could return.
These discussions – involving the US, China, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas – are aimed at getting rid of the North’s nuclear capabilities.

The forum reached deals in 2005 and 2007, under which the North shut down its plants at Yongbyon and began disabling them in return for aid and security guarantees. But the last talks were in December 2008, and in April this year North Korea said the negotiations were over for good, following widespread condemnation of its long-range missile launch. A month later, tensions rose still further when the North conducted an underground nuclear test.

New sanctions

In June, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to impose tougher sanctions on communist North Korea following the nuclear test carried by Pyongyang in defiance of previous UN resolutions.

The sanctions include the inspection of North Korean ships, a wider ban on arms sales and other financial measures. The U.S. deputy ambassador at the UN, Rosemary DiCarlo, said the new vote was a strong and united response to North Korea’s “unacceptable behavior”.

The Chinese ambassador, Zhang Yesui, said the resolution showed the “firm opposition” of the world to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. “We strongly urge the DPRK (North Korea) to honor its commitment to denuclearization, stop any moves that may further worsen the situation, and return to the six-party talks,” the ambassador said. North Korea carried out a nuclear test – its second – on May 25th. It then launched a number of short-range missiles.

President Barack Obama described the North Korean action in May as a threat to international peace. President Obama on North Korea

On May 27th, North Korea announced it is abandoning the truce that ended the Korean war, amid rising tension in the region. It blamed its decision on South Korea joining a US-led initiative to search ships for nuclear weapons. It said the South’s actions were a “declaration of war”, and pledged to attack if its ships were stopped. The move is part of an increasingly hard line being taken by North Korea, and came two days after it conducted an underground nuclear test.

North Korea abandons international talks

North Korea's "satellite" launch

In April North Korea walked out on international talks to end its nuclear program, and said it would restore its disabled nuclear reactor. The unusually strong statement followed criticism by the UN Security Council of a recent rocket launch, which critics say was a long-range missile test. North Korea said the launch in April was part of a peaceful space program, designed to put a satellite into orbit. China and Russia have appealed for the North to return to negotiations.

Pyongyang also ordered UN nuclear inspectors to leave the country and told the International Atomic Energy Agency to remove seals and equipment from the Yongbyon reactor and said that it would reactivate all its nuclear facilities, the watchdog said.

Pyongyang said it launched a satellite on April 5 but its neighbors said it was testing missile technology. The U.S., South Korea and Japan have all condemned the launch from the Musudan-ri base in the north-east of the communist country. They say it violates a UN Security Council resolution adopted in October 2006 which bans North Korea from carrying out ballistic missile activity. Susan Rice, the American envoy to the UN, called Pyongyang’s move a “clear-cut violation of [resolution] 1718″, while her Japanese counterpart said Tokyo was seeking a “clear, firm and unified” response.

Undated North Korean missile test

When North Korea tested its Taepodong-1 missile in 1998, it claimed to have put a satellite in orbit. In July 2006 it test-fired the three-stage long-range Taepodong-2, but the missile failed shortly after launch. North Korea’s move comes amid heightened tensions with South Korea, and with Pyongyang pushing for a top spot on the agenda of the new U.S. administration.

American nuclear inspector in North Korea

In October 2008, the Washington finally removed North Korea from a terrorism blacklist, and in return Pyongyang agreed to provide full access to its nuclear program. The two sides now differ on the terms of verification that were agreed as part of the deal. North Korea insists it never said samples of atomic material could be taken away for examination, but the U.S. asserts that the North did consent to the procedure.

For years, the North has been locked in discussions over its nuclear ambitions with five other nations – the U.S., South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan. In June 2008 the regime blew up the cooling tower of its Yongbyon facility in a symbolic gesture of its commitment to the process.
Video: Demolition of Yongbyon cooling tower

Also in June 2008 North Korea handed over a long-awaited account of its nuclear program to China. President George W Bush cautiously welcomed the move at the time but said the U.S. still had “serious concerns” about Pyongyang. North Korea had previoulsy blamed the deadlocked nuclear talks on the U.S., accusing it of raising “unjust demands”.

North Korea successfully tested a nuclear device on October 9th, 2006, and analysts believe it may have any a number of atomic bombs ranging from one to eight or more. However, it is not believed that the country has yet succeeded in building a nuclear weapon that could be fitted on to a missile.

North Korean missiles

Despite the nuclear agreement Pyongyang tested another ballistic missile in June 2007. The White House said it was “deeply troubled” by the move, which happened at a “delicate time” in international negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear decommissioning.

In May 2007 North Korea conducted a series of missile test after previously having test-fired missiles in July 2006. World powers have condemned the North Korean tests – the test in 2006 is believed to have included a long-range Taepodong-2, but according to U.S. assessments at the time, that missile failed shortly after take-off.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program along with its missile development, has been a major source of concern in the region. North Korea is estimated to have more than 800 ballistic missiles. The communist regime first obtained tactical missiles from the Soviet Union, as early as 1969, but its first Scuds reportedly came via Egypt in 1976.

These are the key weapons of its missile program:

Taepodong-2 (long range)

Taepodong 2

Taepodong-1 (intermediate range)

The Taepodong-1 is a two-stage missile comprising Nodong and Scud parts and has a estimated range of 1,300 miles (2,200km). It could reach US bases in Okinawa, Japan. North Korea tested a Taepodong-1 in August 1998, firing a missile over northern Japan. But it is said to be even less accurate than the Nodong (see below) and it must be fired from a fixed location and has a long preparation time. That means potential launches could be detected relatively early on.

Another Taepodong missile, the Taepodong-X, is also said to be under development but has not yet been tested. Based on a Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile, it is a land-based missile, thought to have a range of up to 2,400 miles (4,000km), able to reach US bases on Guam. Unlike the Taepodong-1, it could be fired from mobile launch systems hidden from view.

Nodong Missile (medium range)

The Nodong missile is thought to have a range of around 600 miles (1,000km) and could potentially carry a nuclear warhead. But it too is not very accurate. The Nodong could strike most of Japan but not with any accuracy. If it were fired on a military target, its inaccuracy could lead to high levels of civilian casualties. The missile was test fired in May 1993.

Short Range Missiles

North Korea has a variety of short-range missiles. The KN-02 is thought to be the most accurate, but its range – around 60 miles – is the shortest. The Scud-B and C have ranges of 200 and 300 miles respectively, while the Scud-D is believed to have a range of over 400 miles. It is thought that these missiles could deliver conventional warheads. The Scud-B, C and D have all been tested and deployed. These missiles would enable North Korea to strike any area in South Korea. The KN-02 missile, currently in the testing stage, could be aimed at key targets in South Korea such as military installations south of the border.

Musudan-ri launch site

Musudan-ri is the main launch site in the country’s North Hamgyong province, on the country’s northeastern coast. The area was formerly known as Taepodong, which gave the Taepodong rockets their name. Since 1984 Hwasong, Nodong and Taepodong rockets have been launched from the site. The facilities at Musudan-ri are reported to be modest, consisting of a launch pad, an engine test stand, a missile assembly building, and a missile control center. In 1998, North Korean media reported the successful launch of a satellite by a Taepodong rocket from Musudan-ri. North Korea says the satellite successfully reached orbit, but no independent sources have confirmed this.

Iran’s decision to build a secret facility represented a “direct challenge to the basic compact” of the global non-proliferation regime, President Barack Obama said, making a statement in Pittsburgh, where he is hosting a G20 summit. Despite Iran’s assertions that the facility was for peaceful purposes, the new plant was “not consistent” with that goal, the President said. Katy Clark reports.

• BBC coverage
• Iran’s key nuclear sites
• BBC Special Report: Iran crisis
• Background Brief: Nuclear Standoff with Iran